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FREEING PROPERTY OWNERS FROM THE RAP
TRAP: TENNESSEE ADOPTS THE UNIFORM
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
AMY MORRIS HESS*
1. INTRODUCTION

No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.
Most second year law students will immediately recognize the above as
the classic statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities (Rule). The Rule in
this form is more than 300 years old; the Lord Chancellor of England
articulated it first in The Duke of Norfolk's Case2 in 1682. 3
The traditional justification for the Rule is that public policy demands
that property owners not be permitted to control property indefinitely.4 On
the other hand, public policy also permits property owners to provide
responsibly for their dependent or incompetent descendants by placing
property in trust for a beneficiary's lifetime plus the period of minority of
the child of the first beneficiary.5 To implement these two policies, the
traditional Rule mandates that all contingent future interests must pass a test
from the moment of their creation. The test is concerned only with
remoteness of vesting. It focuses solely on how long the interest will
remain contingent, not on the nature of the contingency nor on how long

*

Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1968, Barnard

College; J.D., 1971, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Barbara W. Johnson, a member
of the class of 1994 of the University of Tennessee College of Law and now a member of
the Knoxville bar, for her meticulous and thorough research in connection with the
preparation of this Article. I am also grateful to Dan W. Holbrook of the Knoxville bar for
his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Finally, I am indebted to the
University of Tennessee College of Law for providing a summer grant to support research
for this Article. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.
1.

JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).

2. 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 946 (Ch. 1682).
3.

W. BARTON LEACH & OWEN TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 24.4

(1957) (containing an excellent detailed history of the Rule); see also GRAY, supra note 1,
§§ 123-200.1 (containing another exemplary, thorough history of the Rule).
4. LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.4; see also I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) note 1, div. I, pt. I, at 8 (1983); ROBERT J. LYNN, THE
MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 10 (1966).
5. LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.14.
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any given piece of property will remain in trust. Any contingent future
interest that will either vest or fail before the end of the acceptable period
passes the test and is valid. The intended beneficiaries of the interest receive
exactly what the grantor gave them. This is called the validatingside of the
Rule.6 Any interest that might still be contingent when the acceptable time
period ends fails the test and is invalid immediately, as if it had never been
created. The intended beneficiaries receive nothing. This is called the
invalidating side of the Rule.7
The effect of the Rule on contingent future interests is illustrated by the
following simple example. Suppose a property owner wishes to create a
testamentary trust for the benefit of her grandchildren for their lives, with
the remainder passing free of trust to the issue of her grandchildren living
at the death of the last grandchild to die. An estate planner might write
such a bequest as follows:
My Trustee shall hold the property as a single trust for the benefit of
all of my grandchildren, for life, and shall pay the income from the
property to my grandchildren, in equal shares, at least quarterly. Upon the
death of the last of my grandchildren to die, this trust shall terminate, and
my Trustee shall distribute the principal as then constituted, per stirpes, to
my grandchildren's issue who are then living.
The remainder interest of the testator's greatgrandchildren and more
remote descendants is a contingent future interest because the remainder
beneficiaries must survive the testator's grandchildren in order to receive a
share of the trust. Therefore, the remainder interest must pass the Rule's
test to be valid. Unfortunately, it does not, because a grandchild could be
born after the death of the testator, and that grandchild could then live more
than twenty-one years after the death of all of the testator's grandchildren
who were alive when the testator died. 8 The remainder would not vest until
this afterborn grandchild died. In other words, the remainder interest in the
trust potentially remains contingent until the death of someone who was not
a "life in being" when the trust was created and who might die more than
twenty-one years after the death of everyone with an interest in the trust
who was alive when the trust was created ("the measuring lives").' Thus,
the remainder interest of the all of the grandchildren's issue-even those

6. See generally LYNN, supra note 4, at 7.
7. See generally id.
8. E.g., Hassell v. Sims, 141 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tenn. 1940).
9. A detailed explanation of the method for determining measuring lives and testing
a nonvested future interest for compliance with the Rule is beyond the scope of this Article.
Excellent explanations of the mechanical application of the Rule can be found in JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 760-67 (4th ed.
1990), and in THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 178-90 (2d ed. 1984).
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who are themselves alive when the testator dies-is invalid ab initio; it fails
completely.' °
On the other hand, the remainder would survive the Rule if the drafter
had simply confined the class of income beneficiaries to the testator's
grandchildren who were living when the testator died, and had provided that
the trust would terminate when the last such grandchild died. So limited,
the remainder must either fail completely (if none of the issue of the
grandchildren alive when the testator died survives the last income
beneficiary to die) or vest (if at least one greatgrandchild or more remote
descendant of the testator survives the last income beneficiary to die) within
the period of the Rule." The difference between the two dispositions is
that an afterborn grandchild is a potential measuring life under the example
as drafted, but not under the alternative disposition. Thus, the Rule
remainder and validates the alternative despite identical
invalidates the first
2
donative intent.'
Not only is the intent of the transferor in creating the interest irrelevant
to the application of the traditional Rule deliberately targets intent.1 3 This
targeting originates in the belief that property owners must not, regardless
of their intent, be permitted to place conditions upon the absolute ownership
of property for longer than the stated period, as a matter of public policy."
as to equitable
The Rule applies to both real and personal property, as well
5
interests, such as interests in trusts, and legal interests.'

10. This harsh result is caused by the "all-or-nothing" rule governing application of
the Rule to class gifts. If the class has not closed when the contingent future interest is
created, then the interest of all possible members of the class must be proven to vest or fail
within the perpetuities period or none of them is valid. Crockett v. Scott, 284 S.W.2d 289
(Tenn. 1955); Ross v. Stiff, 338 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); LEACH & TUDOR, supra
note 3, § 24.26; see also McCarley v. McCarley, 360 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1962) (construing
an ambiguous bequest of a contingent future interest to grandchildren to apply only to
grandchildren living at the testator's death, thus eliminating the Rule violation).
11. See McCarley, 360 S.W.2d at 29.
12. The drafter could also assure the remainder's validity under the Rule by adding
a perpetuities savings clause to the testator's will. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text.
13. See, e.g., Marks v. Southern Trust Co., 310 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1958)
("[T]he rule against perpetuities is not a rule of construction .... It is not a test to determine
intention; its object is to defeat intention." (citations omitted)). See also LYNN, supra note
4, at 9-10.
14. Several commentators prudently emphasize that the Rule is concerned with the
remoteness of vesting of interests in property, not with restraints upon the alienation of
interests in property. E.g., LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.3; LYNN, supra note 4, at
9. This is important because contingent remainders, the principal targets of the Rule, are
generally freely alienable under modern property law. See LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3,
§ 24.3.
15. GRAY, supra note I, §§ 202, 202.1.
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In addition to destroying the estate plan of any property owner whose
transfers might remain contingent beyond the permissible period, the
traditional Rule is quite harsh in two other respects. First, as noted in
connection with the above example, the Rule invalidates any nonvested
interest immediately upon creation if it fails to satisfy the rule. 16 Second,
the traditional Rule is a rule of "what-may-happen." That is, it invalidates
any interest when any possibility-no matter how remote--exists that the
interest may neither vest nor fail within the time period. The example
above demonstrated this aspect of the Rule. If all the testator's children are
beyond child-bearing age, the possibility that a grandchild of the testator
will be born after the testator's death is extremely remote. Nevertheless, the
possibility exists.' 7 Therefore, the remainder interest is invalid immediately. Similar logic dictates that a contingent future interest may be void
because of the possibility that a decedent's estate may take longer than
twenty-one years to administer; 18 that a living married man may divorce
or outlive his current wife then marry a woman who is not living when the
document is executed;' 9 or that a child two years of age may give birth to
a child.2 °
The second of the traditional policy considerations articulated for the
Rule-that a property owner should be able to place property in trust long
enough to provide for incompetent, profligate, or minor children and
grandchildren-justifies the validating side of the Rule. Neither policy
consideration, however, justifies the force of the invalidating side and its
total, immediate invalidation of all contingent interests that might not vest

16.

E.g., Crockett v. Scott, 284 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tenn. 1955); see also LEACH &

TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.4.

17. See, e.g., McCarley v. McCarley, 360 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1962); Crockett, 284
S.W.2d at 293-94. This possibility is commonly referred to as the "fertile octogenarian,"
because it envisions the possibility that a woman of 80 may give birth to a child. For a
detailed explanation of the history of this application of the Rule and its modem ramifications, see LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.22; see also GRAY, supra note 1, §§ 215,
215.1; LYNN, supra note 4, at 58.
18. This possibility is sometimes referred to as the "slothful executor," because it
envisions an estate that is still in administration more than 21 years after the death of the
testator. See LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.23; LYNN, supra note 4, at 59-60.

19. This possibility is commonly referred to as the "unborn widow" because it
invalidates the contingent future interests of A's widow and their children in the following
disposition: "To A for life, and then to A's widow for life, and then to those of the children
of A who survive the survivor of A and A's widow." See LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3,
§ 24.21; LYNN, supra note 4, at 58-59.

20. This possibility is commonly referred to as "the precocious toddler." It would
invalidate a disposition that directed a trustee, for example, to "pay the principal of this trust
to those of the testator's grandchildren living at the testator's death or born within five years
thereafter who shall attain the age of 21 years." LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.22;
LYNN, supra note 4, at 60-61.
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or fail within the acceptable period. Indeed, both policy considerations can
be accommodated satisfactorily by permitting interests in property to remain
contingent for the period of the Rule and invalidating them only at the
expiration of the period, if they have neither vested nor failed naturally
under the terms of the creating document by that time. The traditional Rule,
in other words, is too big for the job it was created to do. It suits its task
much as did the proverbial sledgehammer used to kill a fly.
Because of the harshness of the Rule, courts have created doctrines that
mitigate its effect. Universally today, an otherwise invalid nonvested
interest is saved by the presence in the creating document of a perpetuities
savings clause that provides for the vesting or failure of any interests that
remain unvested at the end of the maximum period permitted by the
Rule.2 At least one well-known law school textbook for the basic course
in trusts and estates suggests that no careful lawyer ever permits a client to
violate the Rule because a careful lawyer always includes a perpetuities
savings clause in any document that includes a trust. 2 Thus, the Rule
itself has become a "trap for the unwary," frustrating the estate plans of only
those hapless property owners who hire careless or inexperienced lawyers .23
In addition, to save these unfortunate property owners from their
unfortunate choice of lawyer, many jurisdictions have adopted methods of
mitigating the Rule's harshness, such as permitting contingent interests that
fail the test of the Rule to exist during the perpetuities period to see whether
the interest actually vests (or fails) before the end of period,24 or permitting

21. An example of a perpetuities savings clause is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this instrument, this trust shall terminate, if it
has not previously terminated, 21 years after the death of the survivor of the beneficiaries of the trust living at the date this instrument becomes effective. In case of such
termination the then remaining principal and undistributed income of the trust shall be
distributed to the then income beneficiaries in the same proportions as they were, at the
time of termination, entitled to receive the income.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 9, at 814.
22. Id. at 815; see also LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, § 24.7; LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS

AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1029 (1991).

23. The Supreme Court of California suggested that failure to know the intricacies
of the Rule Against Perpetuities was not malpractice in the celebrated case of Lucas v.
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961) (en banc). Whether a court would so hold today, however,
is questionable. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 9, at 815 (citations omitted).
24. This is called the "wait-and-see" doctrine. It is particularly useful to prevent
invalidation of future interests in cases involving administrative contingencies ("slothful
executor" cases), because sufficient time often elapses between the death of the testator and
the decision of the perpetuities litigation such that it becomes certain that the contingent
interests will vest or fail within the perpetuities period. See, e.g., In re Estate of Anderson,
541 So. 2d 423, 432-34 (Miss. 1989). Section 1.4 of the Restatement (Second) of Propery
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judicial reformation of the document creating the interests so that all
interests satisfy the rule.2
The Tennessee Constitution outlaws, but does not define perpetuities.26
Therefore, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the common law Rule
applies to determine the validity of contingent future interests in Tennessee. 27 Furthermore, although Tennessee has long recognized the validity
of perpetuities savings clauses,28 until last year, Tennessee courts have
always applied the pure common law Rule to invalidate contingent future
interests not rescued by a savings clause, without attempting to reform the
invalid interests judicially, or to validate (by using a wait-an-see approach)
those that vest or fail by their own terms within the perpetuities period.
(Donative Transfers) advocates use of the wait-and-see doctrine to save interests that are
defective because of other types of perpetuities violations. If the interest is still contingent
at the end of the maximum time period permitted by the Rule, then the interest fails upon
the expiration of the period. The subject property passes to the next taker as though the
document had provided for the failed contingent interest to terminate at the expiration of the
perpetuities period.
As will be discussed later in this Article, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (USRAP) mandates the wait-and-see approach initially for all nonvested future
interests that violate the Rule at their inception but that might vest within the period of either
the common law Rule or a 90 year period in gross. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901(a) (1993).
25. This approach was originally advocated by Barton W. Leach, see LEACH &
TUDOR, supra note 3, at §§ 24.9-.11, and, as will be discussed later in this Article, is the
solution advocated by the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities if a nonvested future
interest fails to vest within either the period of the common law Rule or the 90 year period
in gross, see infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. Courts that reform documents to
conform to the Rule generally consider themselves bound to make the minimum change in
the dispositive terms necessary to bring all otherwise invalid interests within the requirements
of the Rule. For this reason, the doctrine permitting reformation is often said to be an
application of the cv pres doctrine because the court must reform the document in such a
way as to conform as closely as possible to the grantor's original intent. See DUKEMINIER
& JOHANSON, supra note 9, at 839-45; WILLIAM M. McGOVERN JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 534-35 (1988).
26. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22.
27. Eager v. McCoy, 228 S.W. 709, 711 (Tenn. 1921); Franklin v. Armfield, 34
Tenn. (2 Sneed) 305, 353 (1854).
28. See, e.g., Marks v. Southern Trust Co., 310 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1958). In Marks,
an inter vivos trust for the benefit of those of the grantor's grandchildren who were living
at the death of the grantor's son was held valid because it contained the following clause:
Sixth: As heretofore stated, it is hereby provided and distinctly understood, that this
trust shall not continue longer than the life or lives of the beneficiaries herein-before
mentioned; that is myself, my said son, his said wife, and their said three children, and
twenty-one (21) years thereafter.
Id. at 443.
Although this clause was sufficient to save the nonvested interests of the grantor's
grandchildren, it is not suggested as a drafter's model because it fails to provide for
distribution of the trust assets upon termination.
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Thus, Tennessee property owners hapless enough to choose a lawyer
unskilled in the intricacies of the Rule, or unsophisticated enough to attempt
to draw their own documents, created contingent future interests at their
peril.
Effective July 1, 1994, however, the Tennessee legislature mitigated the
harsh reign of the Rule considerably when it enacted the Tennessee Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (TUSRAP). 29 The Tennessee legislation is based closely on the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
(USRAP), originally promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1986 and now part of the Uniform
Probate Code.3 °
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF

TUSRAP

The statutory rule provides for two alternative tests of vesting, the
traditional common law Rule stated above and a ninety-year period. 3' It
also provides for mandatory judicial reformation of property dispositions
upon petition in certain circumstances. 32 The purpose of this Article is to
evaluate the difference this statutory change will make in estate planning

29.

1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 654 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN.

(Supp. 1994)).
30. UNIF. PROB. CODE
31.

(a)

§§

66-1-201 to -208

§§ 2-901 to -906 (1993).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(a) (Supp. 1994). The section provides as follows:

A nonvested property interest is invalid unless one (1) of the following
conditions is satisfied:
(1) When the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no
later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of an individual then
alive; or
(2) The interest either vests or terminates within ninety (90) years after
its creation.

Id.
32.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-204 (Supp. 1994). The section provides as follows:

Upon the petition of an interested person, a court shall reform a disposition in the
manner that most closely approximates the transferor's manifested plan of distribution
and is within the ninety (90) years allowed by §§ 66-1-202(a)(2), (b)(2) or (c)(2) if any
of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment becomes invalid
under the statutory rule against perpetuities provided in § 66-1-202;
(2) A class gift is not but might become invalid under the statutory rule
against perpetuities provided in § 66-1-202, and the time has arrived
when the share of any class member is to take effect in possession or
enjoyment: or
(3) A nonvested property interest that is not validated by § 66-1-202(a)(1)
can vest but not within ninety (90) years after its creation.
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and in litigating cases involving possible violations of the Rule in Tennessee.
A. Estate Planning
The new statute will not require estate planners to develop any new
strategies. Because of its "later than" approach, the new statute will not
affect documents that create contingent interests that satisfy the common law
Rule, nor will it necessitate changes in the perpetuities savings clauses
currently used by estate planners to prevent inadvertent violations of the
common law rule. Any interest that satisfied the common law Rule will
satisfy TUSRAP. In other words, TUSRAP leaves unchanged the validating
side of the common law Rule. Indeed, although the addition of the ninetyyear period in gross appears to provide additional estate planning opportunities, the commentary to the Uniform Statutory Rule indicates that this is not
the case.33 In fact, paragraph (e) of section 66-1-202 of the Tennessee
Code will automatically convert a "later than" clause to a traditional savings
clause.34 Therefore, nothing is gained by using a "later than" type of
clause and much could be lost, because the clause itself might require the
document to be reformed under the reformation procedure mandated by
section 66-1-204 of the Tennessee Code.35

33. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901 cmt. at 201 (1993).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(e) (Supp. 1994). The section provides as follows:
If, in measuring a period from the creation of a trust or other property arrangement,
language in a governing instrument seeks to disallow the vesting or termination of any
interest or trust beyond, seeks to postpone the vesting or termination of any interest or
trust until, or seeks to operate in effect in any similar fashion upon, the later of:
(1) the expiration of a period of time not exceeding twenty-one (21) years
after the death of the survivor of specified lives in being at the creation
of the trust or other property arrangement; or
(2) The expiration of a period of time that exceeds or might exceed twentyone (21) years after the death of the survivor of lives in being at the
creation of the trust or other property arrangement;
such language is inoperative to the extent it produces a period of time that exceeds
twenty-one (21) years after the death of the survivor of the specified lives.
Id.
35. The commentary to § 2-901(e) of the Uniform Probate Code states that the
"longer or' approach was rejected because it would change the 90 year period from the
average period envisioned by the drafters into a minimum period. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2901 cmt. at 203-04 (1993). The commentary explains that the 90 year period was chosen
as the likely average period during which a valid future interest might remain contingent
because statistical studies indicate that the average age of the youngest living income
beneficiary of a trust is six years, and that a six-year-old has an average life expectancy of
69 years. Thus, a "life in being plus 21 years" is the sum of 69 years and 21 years, or 90
years. Id.
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TUSRAP eliminates one problem that would likely have caused
increasing difficulties for planners and litigators in the future: the period of
gestation often found in statements of the common law Rule.36 The
original purpose of including such a period was to permit a conceived but
unborn child who was thereafter born alive to be treated as a life in being
for purposes of the perpetuities period. However, because of the modern
availability of various methods of assisted conception, an individual may
"give birth" to a child years after the "parent" dies, giving rise to the
possibility that a child might be born more than twenty-one years after one
or both of the child's biological parents are dead. This possibility obviously
raises numerous substantial and complex questions in the law of construction
of wills and trusts as well as in the law of intestate succession. Until these
matters are resolved generally in the law of construction of documents, the
simplest way to deal with them in the context of perpetuities reform is to
disregard the possibility of the birth of such a child.37
In addition, TUSRAP generally does not apply to any nondonative
transfer, except for several enumerated transfers that (1) arise out of
domestic matters, such as transfers pursuant to a premarital or postmarital
agreement, 38 or (2) are related to contracts to make or to refrain from
making a donative transfer.3 9 Therefore, TUSRAP will not apply to such
property interests as options, leases, rights of first refusal, and restrictive
covenants.4" Further, TUSRAP does not apply to fiduciary powers,

36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(d) (Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the period
of gestation in the common law Rule, see LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, at § 24.15.
37. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901(d) cmt. at 202-03 (1993).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205(1)(A) to (D), (G) (Supp. 1994).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205(i)(E), (F), (H) (Supp. 1994).
40. With respect to rights of first refusal and options in gross, TUSRAP may
represent a change in Tennessee law. In Hall v. Crocker, 241 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1951), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a grantor's reservation of a right to repurchase certain
property should the grantee wish to sell was subject to the Rule but did not violate it because
the right had to be exercised within the grantee's lifetime. Id. at 549. See also Powell v.
Sumner County Bd. of Educ., No. 01-A-01-9005CH00190, 1990 WL 170446, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1990) (holding a right of repurchase invalid for violation of the Rule).
Although the author has found no Tennessee case dealing with the application of the
Rule to an option in gross-that is, an option not granted in connection with a lease-the
court in Hall refers to the interest retained by the grantor as an option, and cites with
approval the provisions of the Restatement of Propertystating that an option is void if it may
extend beyond the perpetuities period. Hall,241 S.W.2d at 550. The general rule nationally,
before USRAP was promulgated, was that the Rule covered options in gross. LYNN, supra
note 4, at 15 (footnote omitted).
On the other hand, Tennessee courts had previously held the Rule inapplicable to
restrictive covenants, Commerce Union Bank v. Warren County, 707 S.W.2d 854, 864-65
(Tenn. 1986); Elm Hill Homes, Inc. v. Jessie, 857 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993),
and to leases, Hamblen County v. City of Morristown, 584 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tenn. Ct. App.
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including powers of administration and discretionary powers to distribute
42
principal, 4' nor does it apply to the power to appoint a fiduciary.
Lastly, TUSRAP explicitly exempts from its application any property
interest that was not covered by the common law Rule.43
This last provision has several highly desirable results. First, Tennessee
case law previously excluded from compliance with the common law Rule
several types of interests retained by a grantor, including possibilities of
reverter44 and mineral royalty rights reserved in a grantor,45 and statutes
excluded certain charitable future interests,46 and employee benefit
trusts.47
Second, the common law Rule has never applied to vested
property interests. 48 Tennessee courts have long held that an interest that
can be construed two ways, one of which requires compliance with the Rule
and one of which does not, should be construed so as to avoid application
of the Rule. 49 Therefore, TUSRAP does not apply to any interest that can
reasonably be construed to be vested at the time of creation. Furthermore,
TUSRAP does not define "vested" or "nonvested." Therefore, any interest
that is vested under prior Tennessee case law remains vested after the
enactment of TUSRAP.

1979). TUSRAP preserves such common law exclusions from the Rule. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-1-205(7) (Supp. 1994).
The drafters of USRAP apparently considered adding provisions to the statute dealing
with these nondonative transfers, but decided against doing so because "[tihe Rule Against
Perpetuities is an inappropriate instrument of social policy to use as a control of such

arrangements'" UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-904 cmt. at 212 (1993).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205(2), (4) (Supp. 1994).
42.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205(3) (Supp. 1994).

43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205(7) (Supp. 1994).
44. Commerce Union Bank v. Warren County, 707 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn. 1986);
Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church v. Wagner, 249 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn, 1952).
45. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enters., 645 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
Although no Tennessee case law exists on the applicability of the common law Rule to other
future interests retained by a grantor, the common law Rule, and, therefore, TUSRAP, is
unlikely to apply to these interests in Tennessee because they are universally excluded from
coverage under the common law Rule in those jurisdictions that have considered the question.
An example of such an interest is a right of entry for condition broken.
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-1-114 (1991); see also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-1-205(5) (Supp. 1994).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-106 (Supp. 1991); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-

205(6) (Supp. 1994).
48. E.g., BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 9, at 180-81; JACK W. ROBINSON & JEFF
MOBLEY, PRITCHARD ON THE LAW OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATIONS OF ESTATES
EMBRACING THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN TENNESSEE 285-87 (5th ed. 1994).
49. E.g., Sands v. Fly, 292 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tenn. 1956).
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B. Litigation

The statutory rule will engender the greatest changes in practice
concerning perpetuities in litigation. TUSRAP should reduce litigation
brought to invalidate interests ab initio for violating the Rule. It may also
increase litigation to reform initially invalid interests so that they vest within
the perpetuities period because this remedy was unavailable in Tennessee
before TUSRAP was adopted. Unlike its uniform prototype, the version of
TUSRAP adopted in Tennessee requires reformation of a document that
contains an invalid interest upon petition of any interested person, even if
the interest was created before the effective date of the statute.50
The general rule of section 66-1-202(a)(2) of the Tennessee Code
automatically mandates a "wait-and-see" approach for any interest that
violated the common law Rule at its inception but that might vest or fail
within the ninety-year period in gross. No litigation to test an interest
before the ninety-year period is over may be entertained."
If an interest
remains unvested after the ninety years has expired, reformation is
mandatory upon petition of any interested person. The reformation must
conform as closely as possible to the "transferor's manifested plan of
distribution," and still assure vesting within the ninety-year period in
gross. 3 In addition, if an interest would otherwise be void ab initio
because it violates the common law Rule and it will vest, but not within the
ninety-year period in gross, then reformation is required immediately upon
petition of any interested party.5 4 Finally, a class gift that is not invalid
when a class member's share is payable, must be reformed upon petition
when the share is payable. 55

50. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-206 (Supp. 1994). USRAP permits, but does not
require, a court to reform a document that created an invalid interest before the effective date
of the enactment of USRAP. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-905(b) (1993).
TUSRAP also contains provisions clarifying that a property interest is not vested for
purposes of the statute merely because it would have vested if the common law Rule were
held violated; however, the statute also provides that TUSRAP does not apply to any interest
the validity of which had been determined before the effective date of the statute. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-1-206 (Supp. 1994).
5i. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-903 cmt. at 210-11 (1993).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-204 (Supp. 1994).
53. Id.
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-204(3) (Supp. 1994). As the commentary to the
Uniform Probate Code notes, reformation in this situation should be allowed immediately
because the interest will certainly require reformation upon the expiration of the 90 year
period in gross. Waiting 90 years to reform in such a case serves no purpose. UNIF. PROB.
CODE. § 2-904 cmt. at 211 (1993).
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-204(2) (Supp. 1994).
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To demonstrate how TUSRAP works, this Article will now apply
TUSRAP to the facts of two leading Tennessee cases dealing with the
common law Rule to see how the cases would be decided under TUSRAP.
In StandardKnitting Mills, Inc. v. Allen,56 the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that the following language in a deed to the city of Knoxville created
an executory limitation in favor of the grantor's heirs.
In the acceptance of this deed it is understood and agreed that the ttact of
land herein conveyed shall forever be used as a Park and be called Caswell
Park. In case this is not complied with the property shall revert to the
Heirs of the Party of the First Part .... "
Because executory interests are subject to the Rule, the interest of the
heirs was void ab initio because it might remain contingent beyond the
perpetuities period.
Therefore, the court held, the city of Knoxville
received the land in fee simple absolute, 9 clearing the way for the city to
use the tract for purposes other than as a park, or even to sell the tract to a
private buyer. The court concluded:
It is true the construction we have given to this deed will defeat the
manifest intention of the grantors, which was, on the failure to use this
property as a park the property was to revert to the grantors' heirs; but, no
principle is better settled than that the interest of a grantor or testator,
however clear, must fail of effect if it cannot be carried into effect without
violation of the rules of law. 6'
The facts in Standard Knitting Mills provide an excellent example of
the desirability of the uniform statutory rule. First, the strictures of the law
of future interests in concert with the common law rule against perpetuities
clearly frustrated the intent of the grantors, without serving any public
purpose. The grantors could have achieved their goal by creating a fee
simple determinable instead of a fee simple subject to an executory
limitation. In other words, had the grantors simply conveyed the land to the
city "for so long as it shall be used as a public park" and then provided that
the land should revert to them if the city ever ceased to use the land as a
park, the restriction would have been valid in perpetuity. This is true
because the common law Rule does not apply to interests retained by a
grantor.6' Had the grantors been dead when the city ceased using the land

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

424 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1967).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 801.
Id. (citation omitted).
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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as a public park, the land would have become the property of the residuary
legatees under the grantors' wills, or, if they had died intestate, then the land
would have belonged to the grantors' heirs.62
Under TUSRAP, the executory interest would have been permitted to
exist unmolested until the expiration of the ninety-year period in gross.63
If it vested within that period (because the city ceased to use the land as a
park), the heirs would receive clear fee simple title to the land. 64

If it

remained unvested at the end of ninety years, an interested party could
petition a court to reform the document so that the transfer would conform
as closely as possible to the grantor's plan of distribution within the ninetyyear period.65 Presumably, a court called upon to reform the document in
StandardKnitting Mills would eliminate the executory interest 66after ninety
years, and vest fee simple absolute title to the land in the city.

This solution might be criticized on the ground that it permits the
executory limitation to impede the city's use of the property for ninety
years. 6' The answer to this criticism is twofold. First, the city accepted
the land with the limitation; second, the grantors could have imposed a
similar limitation in perpetuity if they had simply created a fee simple
determinable instead of a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
Surely no useful purpose is served by permitting the city to take advantage
of the grantors' ignorance of the finer points of conveyancing (or of their
unfortunate choice of lawyer) to obtain a fee simple absolute immediately.
Another case illustrating the superiority of the statutory rule over the
common law rule is Ross v. Stff. 5 In Ross, the testator directed that his
residuary estate be placed in a trust for the benefit of his wife, his two
children, and his grandchildren. 69 After providing for administration of the
trust and distribution of the income during the lives of the testator's wife
and children, the will provided:
ITEM XIII:
It is my desire that my estate be kept intact until the death of my
widow, Thelma Moser Ross, and as long as my grandchildren, namely the
children of Thelma Ross Frazier and Nancy Ross Stiff, and any other child

62. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 9, at 58-59.
63. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
64. See id.
65. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-201(3) (Supp. 1994).
66. The court apparently would not have the option of rewriting the document to
create a fee simple determinable, even though that disposition probably would conform
mostly closely to the grantors' plan of distribution, because § 66-1-204 of the Tennessee
Code requires that the court choose a reformation within the 90 year period in gross.
67. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 9, at 834-35.
68.

338 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

69.

Id. at 246.
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or children born to my said wife, Thelma Moser Ross, and myself shall
live.
ITEM XIV:
If upon the death of my said wife, Thelma Moser Ross, and at the
death of the last living grandchild and none of my children or grandchildren or their issue be then living, then I bequeath and devise all my said
property absolutely and equally to my said two brothers, Dr. John Ross and
Lanty M. Ross, and if they not be living the corpus of the estate shall be
divided among their children.7"
Testator died survived by his wife, two children and "numerous"
grandchildren. 7 Because his two children survived him, the class of
grandchildren did not close at his death.72 The possibility remained that
additional grandchildren would be born after the testator's death who would
live more than twenty-one years after the death of his wife, his two children,
and all of his grandchildren living at his death. Thus, the clauses providing
that the trust continue until the death of the last grandchild, and then that the
trust property be distributed to the grandchildren's issue or to the testator's
brothers or their issue were void as violating the rule against perpetuities.73
Although the appellate court conceded that Mr. Ross had drafted the will
himself and likely was unaware of the rule against perpetuities,7 4 the court
found itself compelled to apply the common law Rule and to invalidate all
interests that violated it, including the contingent remainders of the
grandchildren who were already alive when the testator died.75 Thus, the
court affirmed the decision of the trial court,76 which had held that the trust

would terminate upon the death of the testator's widow and the corpus
would be distributed to the income beneficiaries of the trust (testator's
daughters and a granddaughter), in the proportions that they were to receive
the income.77

Like the decision in StandardKnitting Mills, the decision in Ross does
not emanate from any myopic conservatism on the part of the Court of
Appeals; rather, it is simply the result of a straightforward application of the
common law Rule. The resulting disruption of Mr. Ross's estate plan,
despite ample evidence of his intent, is entirely consistent with the
traditional application of the common law Rule.70

70. Id. at 247.
71. Id. at 245.
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. 338 S.W.2d at 250.
74. Id. at 249.
75. Id. at 250.
76. Id. at 253.
77. Id. at 248.
78. Occasionally, a court will construe a document to avoid application of the
common law Rule. For example, in McCarley v. McCarley, 360 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1962),
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Under TUSRAP, the continuation of the Ross trust during the lifetime
of at least some of testator's grandchildren is possible, and the entire
provision might actually be given effect as written. Under TUSRAP, the
trust must be permitted to continue without reformation for at least ninety
years.79 The trust might terminate by its own terms before the expiration
of the ninety-year period because the testator's widow, his children, and all
of his grandchildren whenever born could die before the end of the period.
If that were the case, then the income interests of all grandchildren and the
remainder interests of the grandchildren's issue, the testator's brothers, and
the testator's brothers' children, would all have vested or failed within the
perpetuities period."0
If the ninety-year period expired and the trust were still in existence,
then a reformation proceeding under section 66-1-204 of the Tennessee
Code would be mandatory, upon petition of any interested party. The
disposition that most closely approximates the testator's plan of disposition
and that is within the ninety-year period might be to terminate the trust at
the end of the ninety-year period in gross, and pay the principal in equal
shares to those of the testator's grandchildren who are then the income
beneficiaries."1
the Tennessee Supreme Court construed the word "grandchildren" in a will to mean only
those grandchildren of the testator who were alive when the testator died. Id. at 29. This
eliminated the perpetuities problem because the grandchildren living at the testator's death
became measuring lives.
As in Ross, the trust in McCarley was for the education of the testator's grandchildren,
except that the remainder beneficiaries of the McCarley trust were the testator's children.
Id. at 28. The court reasoned that the testator could not have intended all of her grandchildren, whenever born, to be beneficiaries of the trust because if they were, the trust could not
terminate until her children were dead and could have no more children. Id. at 29. This
interpretation would have rendered the remainder provision meaningless. Id.
The Ross court did not discuss the possibility of limiting the class of grandchildren in
this way to avoid the perpetuities problem. However, the trust provisions in Ross are not as
obviously susceptible of this interpretation as those in McCarley; the ultimate remainder
beneficiaries of the Ross trust were the testator's brothers and their issue, beneficiaries whose
death or survival had no effect on the identity of the members of the class of testator's
grandchildren. Ross, 338 S.W.2d at 247.
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(a) (Supp. 1994).
80. The income interest of the grandchildren could be reformed before the expiration
of 90 years, under § 66-1-204(2) of the Tennessee Code, when the income became payable
to the grandchildren.
81. Apparently, the trust must terminate after 90 years even if no grandchildren had
been born after the testator's death, and the testator's children were all dead when the 90
years expired. In other words, TUSRAP does not permit the use of the traditional wait-andsee approach to validate contingent remainders under the common law Rule when subsequent
deaths or other events make violation of the Rule impossible. The interest must either
comply with the common law Rule when it is created, or terminate within the 90 year period.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(a) (Supp. 1994).
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This result might also be criticized because it leaves ownership of the
remainder of the trust uncertain for ninety years. However, if the testator
in Ross simply added a savings clause that required termination of the trust
upon the death of the last to die of his spouse and all of his lineal descendants who were living at this death, no violation would exist under the
common law Rule, and the trust might well last longer than ninety years.
It is hard to see how the TUSRAP solution is less desirable than use of a
savings clause.
IV. CONCLUSION: Is

ADOPTION OF

TUSRAP A

GOOD CHANGE?

Until Tennessee adopted TUSRAP last year, no remedy existed under
Tennessee law to save a transfer that violated the common law Rule. Thus,
any nonvested interest that might violate the Rule-no matter how unlikely
the state of facts that would cause the violation-was void ab initio, as
though it had never been created. On the other hand, any interest drafted
to remain unvested for the maximum length permitted by the Rule without
violating it was valid, no matter how many years it lasted. The Rule created
obstacles to effective estate planning without implementing any public
policy that could not have been implemented with substantially less
disruption to the estate plans of Tennessee citizens.
A leading scholar criticized the Rule for decades.82 The American Law
Institute endorsed the wait-and-see approach to mitigating the Rule's
harshness as part of the Restatement (Second) of Property.8 3 Finally, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
the first Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities in 1986, now codified
as part of the Uniform Probate Code.84
TUSRAP will not invalidate any nonvested interest that satisfied the
requirements of the common law Rule. In fact, a section of TUSRAP
codifies the validating side of the common law Rule.85 Nor will it change
the way conscientious lawyers create contingent future interests in their
clients' estate planning documents. Further, contingent future interests saved
from oblivion by TUSRAP are unlikely to endure longer than those created
by sophisticated estate planners adept at drafting savings clauses that extend
trusts to the maximum time permitted by the common law Rule.86 What

82. E.g., LEACH & TUDOR, supra note 3, §§ 24.9-. I1; W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities
in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952).
83. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4 (1983).
84. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901 to -906 (1993).
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).

86. One scholar conducted an empirical study of all perpetuities cases decided during
a five-year period in states which applied the common law Rule. She compared the results
in the reported decisions with the results that would likely obtain under USRAP, and
concluded that USRAP was unlikely to have extended the duration of any of the trusts that
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TUSRAP does do is prevent complete frustration of the estate plans of
testators who inadvertently violate the Rule, while still implementing the
public policy against indefinite remoteness of vesting.
USRAP is not without its detractors. The main criticism of those who
prefer the traditional Rule is that USRAP will permit grantors to keep
valuable interests in the limbo of conditions precedent for as long as ninety
years. 8 ' As we have seen, however, the common law rule has the same
potential. To return to our original example: 88 a testator who wishes to
create a trust for her grandchildren for their lives, with a remainder to the
grandchildren's issue, can create such a trust validly under the common law
Rule simply by adding a perpetuities savings clause that will terminate the
trust twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of all of the testator's
lineal descendants who were living when the testator died. If a grandchild
of this testator is born the day before the testator's death and the grandchild
lives eighty years, the trust potentially could last 101 years under the
common law Rule (i.e., 80 + 21), which is longer than the wait-and-see
period of ninety years under TUSRAP. Furthermore, TUSRAP will not
change the effect of the perpetuities savings clause.
If a ninety-year period of remoteness of vesting is too long, then the
appropriate solution is to abolish the common law Rule and substitute an
appropriate maximum period in gross for the duration of all trusts. If the
common law Rule is to remain part of our law of future interests, however,
TUSRAP is a highly desirable and long overdue reform.

were litigated substantially longer than they would have endured had the documents of
transfer contained good savings clauses. Mary L. Fellows, Testing PerpetuitiesReforms: A
Study of Perpetuity Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 597, 671 (1991).
87. E.g., Ira M. Bloom, PerpetuitiesRefinement: There Is An Alternative, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 23 (1987); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1648 (1985).
88. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.

